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142 DAVIS ,v. EAST CONTRA COSTA IRR. DIST. [19 C. (2d) 
district, and by its failure to maintain adequate drainage 
facilities. Although the complaint does not allege in express 
terms that the condition created by the district was "dan-
gerous or defective," the facts stated show that it was such, 
and the use of the words of the statute would add nothing 
except the statement of a conclusion. The word "danger-
ous," as ordinarily defined, means "attended or beset with 
danger; full of risk; perilous" (Webster's New International 
Dictionary, Second Edition). Manifestly the condition cre-
ated by the district's activities over a long period of years in 
transporting great quantities of water for irrigation and in 
permitting it to escape, seep, or overflow from canals and 
ditches in such volume as to raise the water level underlying 
the appellants' lands to an extent which has rendered them 
useless for agricultural or horticultural purposes, is a con-
dition "dangerous" to their property. The same is true of 
the district's failure to maintain drainage facilities adequate 
to remedy the situation. 
The appellants allege in a second cause of action that dam-
age has resulted from the district's transportation and dis-
tribution of artificial water by seepage and overflow through 
canals and ditches to lands within the district, "including 
lands now owned by defendant district in the vicinity of 
plaintiffs' said lands." These allegations, the appellants 
contend, merely charge damage caused by the condition of 
lands belonging to and under the control of third parties, 
not by the condition of property of the district. But this 
argument is not supported by their pleading because they 
base all of their causes of action upon the charge that the 
district is wholly responsible for the damage. No claim is 
made against other owners of land in the vicinity. 
In the last analysis the appellants' causes of action charge 
no more than that the district permitted its water to escape 
and flood and damage their land. If the district permitted 
the water to escape, a dangerous condition necessarily re-
sulted. Under such circumstances the Irrigation District 
Liability Law, supra, is applicable and a claim must be filed 
as the basis for a cause of action. The fact that this statute 
does not apply to property "taken" for public use, as dis-
tinguished from property "damaged" for such use does not 
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aid the appellants as their complaint alleges only damage to 
and not a taking of their property. 
The judg!1lent is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Traynor, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion in this case is predicated upon the 
rule announced in the majority opinion in the case of Powers 
Farms, Inc., v. Oonsolidated Irrigation District this day de-
cided. I filed a dissenting opinion in the Powers Farms case 
which covers the same legal propositions involved in the 
above-entitled cause, and for the reasons stated and upon 
the authorities cited in my dissenting opinion in the Powers 
Farms case, in my opinion the judgment against the plaintiff 
in this case should be reversed. 
[L. A. No. 17737. In Bank. Dec. 5, 1941.] 
FIFTH STREET BUILDING (a Corporation), Respondent, 
v. CHA.RLES J. McCOLGA.N, as Franchise Tax Com-
missioner, etc., Appellant. 
[1] Oorporations - Taxation - Franchise Taxes - To Whom As-
sessed-Trustee in Bankruptcy.-In view of 28 U. S. C. A., 
§ 124a, a trustee in bankruptcy conducting the business of a 
corporation adjudged bankrupt is not immune from payment 
of the corporation franchise tax (Stats. 1929, p. 19, as amended 
by Stats. 1935, pp. 959, 995, 1245, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, 
Act 8488). The trustee has the status of the corporation for 
the purpose of the tax. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Benjamin J. Scheinman, Judge. Re-
versed with directions. 
Action for refund of franchise tax paid by a trustee in 
bankruptcy. Judgment for plaintiff on the pleadings re-
versed with directions. 
[1] See 6.A ,Oal. Jur. 1632. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Corporations, § 914. 
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Earl Warren, Attorney General, and H. H. Linney and 
Valentine Brookes, Deputies Attorney General, for Appellant. 
Flint & Mackay and Clark J. Milliron for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On December 30, 1934, Walkers' Inc., a 
domestic corporation doing business in California, filed a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the District Court of 
the United States, Southern District of California. It was 
adjudicated a bankrupt, and a trustee in bankruptcy was 
appointed who carried on the business from December :31, 
1934, until about July 26, 1938. On March 9, 1937, the 
trustee filed a franchise tax return under the Bank and 
Corporation Franchise Tax Act (Stats. 1929, p. 19, as 
amended by Stats. 1935, pp. 959, 995, 1245, Deering's Gen. 
Laws, 1937, Act 8488), and paid a franchise tax of $4,764.17 
for the taxable year 1937. In 1938 Walkers' Inc. was 
discharged from bankruptcy.) The trustee filed a claim, 
which was denied, for the refund of the 1937 franchise tax. 
By an order of the federal court plaintiff, Fifth Street Build-
ing, became the assignee of the claim for refund and brought 
suit for the recovery of the tax paid by the trustee. Both 
the plaintiff and defendant filed motions for judgment on 
the pleadings, and judgment was entered in favor of the 
plaintiff for the refund of the tax in question. From that 
judgment defendant has taken this appeal. 
[1] Plaintiff contends that the trustee in bankruptcy was 
not subject to the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, 
which imposes a tax on corporations doing business in the 
state for the privilege of exercising their corporate fran-
chises therein. In plaintiff's view the corporation's fran-
chise did not pass to the trustee but he carried on the 
business as an individual, immune from the taxes applicable 
solely to corporations. 
This contention would revive an issue, once highly contro-
versial, laid at rest by an Act of Congress of June 18, 1934, 
28 U. S. C. A. § 124a. (See United States v. Whitridge, 231 
U. S. 144 [34 Sup. Ct. 24, 58 L. Ed. 159]; Michigan v. 
Michigan Trust Co., 286 U. S. 334 [52 Sup. Ct. 512, 76 L. Ed. 
1136] ; Reinecke v. Gardner, 277 U. S. 239 [48 Sup. Ct. 472, 
72 L. Ed. 866] ; Bright v. State of Arkansas, 249 Fed. 950, 
162 C. C. A. 148; Kansas City v. J oknson, 70 Fed. (2d) 360; 
Dec. 1941.] FIFTH STREET BUILDING V. MCCOLGAN. 
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In re Oontinental Candy Co;, 291 Fed. 773; In re Century 
Silk Mills, Inc., 12 Fed. (2d) 292.) The Act of Congress 
provides: 
"Any receiver, liquidator, referee, trustee, or other offi-
cers or agents appointed by any United States court who is 
authorized by said court to conduct any business, or who 
does conduct any business shall, from and after June 18, 
] 934, be subject to all State and local taxes applicable to 
such business the same as if such business were conducted by 
an individual or corporation." 
This language envisages precisely such situations as the 
present one. The trustee, appointed after June 18, 1934, by 
a United States court, conducted the business theretofore 
carried on by Walkers' Inc., then subject to the franchise 
tax as it would have continued to be had it not gone into 
bankruptcy. The Act of Congress makes it clear that the 
appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy by a federal court 
does not relieve a business of the state and local taxes to 
which it is normally subject. "What Congress intended 
was that a business in receivership or conducted under court 
order, should be subject to the same tax liability as the 
owner would have been if in possession and operating the en-
terprise." (Palmer v. Webster &; Atlas Nat. Bank v. Boston, 
312 U. S. 1~6 [61 Sup. Ct. 542, 545; 85 L. Ed. 642]; see 
also, Philadelphia Co. et al. v. Dipple, 312 U. S. 168 [61 
Sup. Ct. 538, 85 L. Ed. 651]; Boteler v. Ingels, 308 
U. S. 57 [60 Sup. Ct. 29, 84 L. Ed. 78]; Thompson v. 
Louisiana, 98 Fed. (2d) 108; In re Vicksburg Bridge &; 
Terminal Co., 24 Fed~ Supp. ]23; International Shoe Co. v. 
Picard &; Geismar, 30 Fed. Supp. 570; In re Kentucky Fuel 
Gas Corp., 37 Fed. Supp. 625; The Southern Cross, 120 
Fed. (2d) 466.) 
It was settled in Boteler v. Ingels, supra, not only that 
a trustee in bankruptcy comes within the meaning of the 
Act of Congress and cannot therefore escape the applicability 
of a state tax, but that the trusteeship can in no way mili-
tate against the effective enforcement of the tax. In that 
case a trustee in bankruptcy operated automobiles on the 
California highways without obtaining the licenses required 
by California -laws or paying the state automobile license tax. 
The court upheld a penalty of 100 per cent, stating: 
/ 
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" ... Congress has here with vigor and clarity declared 
that a trustee and other court appointees who operate busi-
nesses must do so subject to state taxes 'the same as if 
such business (es) were conducted by an individual or cor-
poration.' If businesses in California not conducted by a 
bankruptcy trustee are delinquent in the' fees, they must 
pay the penalty . . . petitioner's contention would exempt 
a trustee operating a business in bankruptcy from this double 
tax liability which other delinquents must bear. A state 
would thus be accorded the theoretical privilege of taxing 
businesses operated by trustees in bankruptcy on an equal 
footing with all other businesses, but would be denied the 
traditional and almost universal method of enforcing prompt 
payment." 
There is no need to amend the Bank and Corporation 
Franchise Tax Act to specify that a trustee in bankruptcy 
conducting the business of a corp6ration shall be subject 
to the tax as if he were a corporation in order to insure 
that an intervening bankruptcy will not interrupt the ap-
plication of the tax. (Thompson v. -Louisiana, supra.) The 
Act of Congress already provides that state taxes are as 
applicable to such a business as if it were conducted by a 
corporation, and thus gives to the trustee the status of a 
corporation for the purpose of the tax. That status is de-
termined by Congress in the exercise of its plenary authority 
over the administration of a bankrupt's estate. (Thompson 
v. Louisiana, supraj In re Landquist, 70 Fed. (2d) 929.) 
Congress creates the trusteeship, fixes the conditions of its 
existence and may provide, as in the Act of 1934, that a 
trustee be regarded as of such a nature as to come within 
the range of state tax laws. 
Plaintiff's complaint therefore does not state a cause of 
action and since amendment could be of no avail the judg-
ment is reversed with instructions to enter judgment on the 
pleadings for the defendant. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., 
a.nd Carter, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
31, 194L 
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[L. A. No. 17917. In Bank. Dec. 5, 1941.] 
ROSS OWEN, Respondent, v. ISRA.EL COHEN, Appellant. 
[1] Partnership-Particular Kinds-At Will.-The finding that 
the partnership was one at will was unsupported where the 
existence of such a partnership was negatived by uncontra-
dicted evidence that the partners at the inception of their 
undertaking agreed that all obligations incurred by the part-
nership, including an obligation for money advanced by one 
partner, would be paid out of profits. 
[2] Appeal- Determination - Harmless and Reversible Error-
Findings-Against Evidence-Findings not Necessary.-A de-
cree dissolving a partnership will not be reversed for the 
reason that a finding that the partnership was one at will 
and dissoluble by one member thereof is unsupported by the 
evidence, where such decree is amply supported by the other 
facts found relating to a breach of the partnership agreement 
by one member thereof. 
[3] Partnership-Dissolution-Methods and Causes-By Decree 
of Court-Lack of Harmony.-A case for judicial dissolu-
tion of a partnership, under Civ. Code, § 2426, was made out 
where the court was warranted in finding from the evidence 
that there was very bitter, and antagonistic feeling between 
the partners, that under their agreement for handling of the 
partners~ip business the duties of the parties required co-
operation, coordination and harmony, and that under the ex·· 
istent conditions the partners were incapable of carrying on 
their business to their mutual advantage. 
[4] Id.-Accounting-Judgment-Sale and Distribution of Assets 
-Payment of Partner's Loan.-~ven though a partnership 
agreement may provide that a loan of money by one partner 
to the partnership is to be paid from profits, a partner whose 
conduct caused the dissolution of the partnership may not 
complain of that part of the decree which provides for pay-
ment of the partner's loan out of the proceeds of the sale of 
the partnership assets. 
[5] Id.-Dissolution-Accounting-Judgment-Sale and Distribu-
tion of Assets-Credit to Partner Out of Proceeds of Sale. 
Upon dissolution of a partnership, a partner may not com-
[3] See 20 Cal. Jur. 799; 20 R. C. L. 958. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Partnership, § 6; [2] Appeal and 
Error, § 1681; [3] Partnership, § 74 (4); [4,5] Partnership, 
§ 121(1); [6] Costs, § 11. 
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